Adaptive learning models that have been tested against experimental data typically share two features: (i) initial attractions (or beliefs) are given exogenously, and (ii) learning is based on the performance of stage-game actions rather than repeated game strategies. We develop a model of learning which endogenizes initial attractions and allows for the learning of repeated game strategies. Learning occurs in two phases.
Introduction
Within the literature on learning in games, two distinct strands may be identified. One deals with the abstract question of the long-run convergence properties of learning models, with particular attention paid to the conditions under which learning leads to Nash equilibrium. The second deals with the more empirical task of describing the manner in which human subjects learn in laboratory interactions. The latter class of learning models can be further subdivided into those that are belief-based, such as fictitious play, and those based on reinforcement. In belief-based models, subjects use observed histories of opponent actions to predict future play, and respond optimally to such beliefs. Reinforcement learning, in contrast, is based on the hypothesis that the propensity to chose an action increases or decreases in response to the payoff experience resulting from the choice of that action. Both belief-based and reinforcement learning models are special cases of experience-weighted attraction (EWA) learning, which allows for the reinforcement not only of actions taken, but also of actions that were not taken, based on the imagined payoffs that such actions would have yielded.
1
Adaptive learning models have been reasonably successful in accounting for observed behavior in certain strategic environments, such as games with a unique mixed strategy equilibrium and some coordination games, while failing dramatically to replicate human behavior in others. For example, when experimental subjects are paired to play a Prisoner's Dilemma for a finite number of periods under conditions of full information, convergence to mutual cooperation occurs frequently for many payoff configurations. In contrast, fictitious play predicts convergence to mutual defection for all parameter values. Similarly, in the Battle of the Sexes, fixed subject pairs frequently alternate between the two pure-strategy 1 Fudenberg and Levine (1998) provide a detailed survey of the theoretical literature. The experimental learning literature is vast; see, for instance, Crawford (1995) , Cheung and Friedman (1997) , Mookherjee and Sopher (1997) , and Erev and Roth (1998) . EWA learning was developed by Camerer and Ho (1999) , who also show that it generalizes both fictitious play and reinforcement learning. Stahl (1999 Stahl ( , 2000 has developed a model allowing for the learning of behavioral rules, defined broadly as mappings from games and histories to probability distributions over actions. equilibria of the stage game, thus managing to achieve payoff profiles that are both equitable and efficient. Neither reinforcement learning nor fictitious play can account for this, with both models predicting convergence to the repeated play of one or the other pure-strategy stage-game equilibria.
2
One could conceivably account for the disparity between experimental findings and the predictions of learning models by arguing that subjects care not just about their own monetary payoffs, but also about the payoffs obtained by those with whom they interact. Several recent attempts have been made to identify a richer class of preferences which are able to take such interdependencies into account in a manner consistent with experimental behavior.
3
From this perspective, payoff functions must be appropriately transformed before learning models can properly be tested or compared. While this is an important and promising direction for research, there is as yet no consensus on the precise manner in which monetary payoffs should be transformed in order to conform to 'social preferences'. Moreover, as we argue below, behavior that appears to be motivated by a concern for fairness and efficiency can in fact be the consequence of an entirely orthodox process of learning in which material payoffs are the driving force.
In this paper we maintain the hypothesis that subjects are motivated primarily by a concern with their own monetary payoffs, but allow for the possibility that subjects learn not just among stage game actions but also among repeated game strategies. The limitations of action-learning models are well recognized in the literature. Erev and Roth (1998, p.872) , for instance, note that it will "not generally be the case that learning behavior can be analyzed in terms of stage game actions alone." Along similar lines, Camerer and Ho (1999, p.871) point out that "stage game strategies are not always the most natural candidates for the strategies that players learn about, " and McKelvey and Palfrey (2001, p.19) have argued for the development of "strategic learning" models in which players learn not about the performance of actions but rather of strategies (see also Stahl and Haruvy (2002) ).
The development of strategic learning models has been inhibited, however, by two potential obstacles. First, the size of the strategy space precludes experimentation with all but a few strategies in any given interaction. In fact, any learning rule can itself be interpreted as a single repeated game strategy. This problem can be overcome, as McKelvey and Palfrey point out, by restricting the complexity of repeated game strategies. The second difficulty arises from the fact that if players are learning among repeated game strategies, it becomes impossible to compute the hypothetical payoffs that would have been obtained had a different strategy been chosen. Hence, even with observable actions and stage-game payoff functions, neither fictitious play nor the general version of experience-weighted attraction learning can be implemented. As McKelvey and Palfrey observe, "players face an inference problem going from histories to beliefs" about the strategies of their opponents.
When learning responds only to payoffs obtained by strategies actually chosen by the subject, this inference problem does not arise. A much maligned attribute of reinforcement learning, therefore, turns out to be an advantage in developing models of learning among repeated game strategies. In a straightforward extension of their earlier models of reinforcement learning, Erev and Roth (2001) have studied the Prisoner's Dilemma while allowing for players to choose among the two stage-game actions as well as the "tit-for-tat" repeated game strategy. Allowing for the possibility that subjects can learn to reciprocate significantly improves the predictive power of the model. It does so at a cost, however. Erev and Roth assume, in effect, that "tit-for-tat" is the only repeated game strategy to have positive probability weight when the process of learning begins. This choice is fundamentally arbitrary, and raises the question of why other strategies cannot also have positive initial weight. More generally, one would like a theory of initial attractions that identifies the set of repeated game strategies which experimental subjects explore.
Developing such a theory is the principal aim of this paper. Our contribution can be thought of as a reinforcement based approach to learning over long horizons in a 'preexperimental' phase, that determines which repeated game strategies are salient when subjects enter the laboratory. It is in this sense a theory of the initial attractions that appear as parameters in standard learning models. In our model learning occurs over a long horizon, and begins with positive weight on each repeated game strategy that satisfies a bounded complexity constraint. Specifically, we consider all strategies that can be represented by automata having no more than two states.
4
The model may be described briefly as follows. A large, fixed population is divided into subject pairs. There are two phases of learning. During the first, 'pre-experimental' phase, subjects engage in a lengthy process of learning among repeated game strategies while being occasionally rematched with other members of the population. There is a finite set of simple repeated game strategies from which subjects choose. At the start of the first phase of learning, each of the repeated game strategies has equal attraction, and hence equal probability of being chosen. Attractions are updated over time as the payoffs resulting from strategy choices are observed. Subjects maintain their chosen strategies for several repetitions of the stage game, with the length of this period determined stochastically. Specifically, at each stage, there is some small and constant probability that attractions will be updated and strategy revision will occur. Only strategies which are actually chosen are updated, based on their observed payoff consequences. If strategy revision occurs, the (possibly) new strategy is chosen on the basis of updated attractions. There is also a small probability that at any stage, subjects pairs are dispersed and individuals are re-matched with other subjects drawn from the population. Over the course of this process some strategies decline in use while others are observed with greater frequency. The process continues until convergence to a limiting distribution is approximated, and this ends the first phase of learning. The limiting attractions from the first phase are then used as initial attractions in the second, which consists of a fixed-pair matching for a small number of periods. Learning also occurs in the second phase, but without rematching. This corresponds to the conditions of an experiment, and enables us to compare our results with reported experimental data. This two-phase learning captures the notion that experimental subjects bring whatever they have learned elsewhere into the laboratory. The first "pre-experimental" phase corresponds to the real life experience of players where they learn which strategies work the best in various strategic environments through interacting with many other people. And they bring the knowledge from the first phase into the second "experimental" phase which is comparable to the laboratory setup. We find that several patterns of behavior which are difficult to reconcile with action-learning models, such as cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma and alternation between pure-strategy equilibria in the Battle of the Sexes, emerge as outcomes of our learning procedure. To get a feel for the differences in the outcomes of the learning models versus the outcomes of the experiments, consider their findings for the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Battle of the Sexes (Figure 1 ). Although AMP report only the average payoff profile obtained by each subject pair, it is possible to make some clear inferences about the path of actions chosen. In the Prisoner's Dilemma, over half of the human data are tightly grouped around the payoffs of (8, 8) , implying that the subjects have coordinated on the non-equilibrium action profile (A, A). The rest of the data points imply a mix of actions, such as exploiting a cooperator by defecting, as well as being exploited when cooperating. Fictitious play immediately converges to the unique Nash equilibrium with payoffs of (2, 2). Most reinforcement learning data points are scattered in an area relatively close to the Nash equilibrium. Although better results might be achieved with a recalibration of the models (as indeed we show below) there are clear qualitative differences between the predictions of the learning models and the behavior of most human subjects.
Two Examples
In the Battle of the Sexes, the majority of the experimental data points are closely scattered around the payoff profile (12, 12), implying that players coordinated by alternating between the two pure-strategy stage-game Nash equilibria. Fictitious play converges to one of the two pure-strategy equilibria, while the data points for reinforcement learning are scattered between the three equilibria. Similarly, in the 2 × 2 Stag Hunt and in the game of Chicken, the majority of experimental subjects coordinate their strategies so as to maximize joint payoffs while preserving an equitable distribution, a pattern of behavior that is difficult for action-learning models to consistently replicate.
Learning Among Repeated Game Strategies
Any analysis of learning among repeated game strategies requires some restriction on the space of available strategies. This is achieved here by restricting the complexity of the strategies available to players. One way of assessing the complexity of a repeated game strategy is on the basis of its representation as a finite automaton. The larger the number of states a strategy requires in automaton representation, the greater its complexity. 5 This section starts with a brief description of the manner in which a repeated game strategy can be represented as a finite automaton. We then proceed to discuss the learning model in some detail.
Representing Repeated Game Strategies with Automata
An automaton is described by four components: a set of states, an initial state that the automaton occupies at the outset, an output function that indicates which action is to be taken in each particular state, and a transition function that indicates which state will be reached in the next period given the current state and the current actions of the opponent.
The current state of an automaton contains all information about the history of play that is Another strategy that can be represented as a two-state automaton is 'grim trigger', also shown in Figure 2 . Again, the two states are associated with the two available actions, cooperation and defection. The initial state is again cooperation, but the transition function is different. A defection by the opponent triggers a move to the defection state, which is absorbing (the automation never leaves this state).
Each of the above strategies require a memory of at most one action by the opponent.
A slightly more complex strategy is 'tit-for-two-tats', illustrated in Figure 3 . This strategy starts with cooperation and defects only if the opponent defects twice in a row. In order to implement this strategy, a three-state automaton is required. In the figure, the i-th state is denoted by S i and the action to be taken in each state follows the colon after the state.
The initial state is S 0 in which the player cooperates. If the opponent defects, state S 1 is reached. The player still cooperates in this state but remembers that the last action by the opponent was defection. Cooperation by the opponent when the player is in this state leads
to a return to S 0 . On the other hand, if the opponent defects again, S 2 is reached and the player defects. Cooperation by the opponent when the player is in S 2 induces a return to
In this paper, we restrict attention to strategies representable by one-or two-state automata. When the stage game is 2 × 2, this results in a total of 26 possible repeated game strategies. 
Reinforcement Learning Among Strategies
Consider a population of players N = {1, 2, 3, ...., N } and a specified symmetric 2 × 2 stage game. During the first phase of learning, players drawn from the population are matched pairwise to play the stage game repeatedly. Players use the same strategy across several periods, but occasionally switch strategies as part of a process of experimentation.
They are also randomly rematched with other partners from time to time. Let ρ ∈ (0, 1) represent the probability that a player switches to a (possibly) new strategy at the start of any given period, and µ ∈ (0, ρ) the probability that a player is randomly re-matched against a (possibly) different opponent at the start of any given period.
6 There are two possible states for an automaton and two possible actions by the opponent. The transition function thus maps four different possibilities of (own state, the opponent's action) pairs into the set of two states to be taken in the next period. This generates 2 4 = 16 cases in total. As each of these can have one of two initial states, we have a total 32 possible automata. Among these, however, four always play the first action and another four always play the second. Elimination of non-unique automata yields a total of 26, of which two are one-state and the rest two-state automata. Appendix B contains a complete listing of these.
Players have propensities or 'attractions' associated with each of their strategies, and these attractions determine the probabilities with which strategies are chosen when players experiment. At the start of the first phase, all strategies have equal attraction and hence equal probability of being chosen.
7 Learning takes place through the evolution of attractions:
prior to updating her strategy, a player evaluates the performance of the strategy she has been utilizing and updates her attractions accordingly (the precise manner in which this occurs is described below). Since the learning process is defined over strategies, players are required to play the stage game a number of times to evaluate their current strategy, that is, to obtain information on their strategy's payoff consequences. If ρ is not too large, meaningful evaluations of repeated game strategies are possible. Notice that unlike the action learning, players need not update their strategies simultaneously. When players are re-matched, they also update their strategies. 8 This process continues until the limiting distribution of attractions is approximated, at which point the second 'experimental' phase begins. This consists of a fixed number of periods without further re-matching. Learning occurs also in this phase, building on the attractions generated during the pre-experimental phase.
Let A i s (t) denote player i's attraction to the strategy s ∈ S at period t, where S = {1, 2, 3, . . . , 26} is player i's set of 26 strategies. For each player, attractions are updated when the player updates her strategy. Only the strategy that was chosen at the previous strategy update is reinforced, as follows. Consider a player who updates her strategy choice at the start of period t, and uses the same strategy s ∈ S without further updates until the start of period t + τ . Specifically, suppose that s
, where
is the strategy used by player i in period r. Define the reinforcement value R i (t, t+τ −1) of the strategy used over the periods t, ..., t + τ − 1 as the average payoff obtained by player i over this period:
where π i (r) is the payoff obtained by player i in period r. When strategy revision next occurs (at the start of period t + τ ), player i's attraction or propensity for playing strategy s evolves as a weighted average of its previous value and the reinforcement value:
Here ω ∈ (0, 1) is a weight placed on the reinforcement value, R(·, ·), which is the average payoff the player has obtained from using strategy s since the last strategy update, i.e., between period t and t + τ − 1.
9 The probability of a player i choosing strategy s, when she updates her strategy in the beginning of period t, depends on the attractions as follows:
The parameter λ ≥ 0 in the logistic transformation represents the extent to which strategies with higher attractions are favored in strategy choice. When λ = 0, all strategies are equally likely to be chosen, regardless of their attractions. As λ increases, strategies with higher attractions become disproportionately more likely to be chosen. In the limiting case λ → ∞, the strategy with the highest attraction is chosen with probability one.
In the long horizon 'pre-experimental' phase of learning, the initial attraction, A s (0), for all strategies is set equal to the expected payoff given random choice of actions by both players. As an example, consider the Prisoner's Dilemma game described in Figure 1 . Here a player's initial attraction for each of her 26 strategies is given by A 1 (0) = . . . = A 26 (0) = 1 4
(8 + 1 + 9 + 2) = 5. The pre-experimental phase continues until the limiting distribution of attractions or probability weights placed on strategies are approximated. This is done as follows. Let p s (·) be the population average probability weight on strategy s in a given period, and let p s (m) be the mean of the population average probability weight on strategy s over the m-th block of R periods:
The convergence criterion employed in the simulation was
for several (specifically twenty) consecutive m's. That is, the pre-experimental phase is terminated if the absolute difference between two consecutive means of the population average probability weights are, on average, less than ε for a long time.
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In the second 'experimental' phase of learning, we assume that players bring with them to the laboratory the values of A s (·) that they have reached at the conclusion of the first phase. In this latter phase, players are randomly paired to play and learn over the course of one match with 50 periods (without re-matching). This corresponds to McKelvey and Palfrey's experimental conditions, as reported in AMP.
11
There are total of four parameters in this model: the strategy updating rate ρ, the rematching probability µ, the weight ω on reinforcement values in attraction updates, and the sensitivity λ of the strategy choice to the attraction level in the logistic transformation.
In addition, the number of players N needs to be large to ensure multiple interactions among 10 The maximum length of the pre-experimental phase in each of the simulation runs has been set to 500,000 periods. In principle, it is possible to have a simulation run that does not satisfy the convergence criterion before the final period if ε is very small. However, we obtained convergence in all cases, using a value of ε = 0.005 and R = 1000.
11 Simulations were coded and run using Borland C++. The source code is available from the authors upon request.
various players in the pre-experimental phase.
Results
We have limited our attention to the four symmetric 2 × 2 games for which results are reported in the AMP, namely the 2 × 2 Stag Hunt, Prisoner's Dilemma, Chicken, and the Battle of the Sexes. We begin by describing results of the pre-experimental phase, i.e., the limiting distributions of probability weights across the 26 strategies, with a focus on strategies that obtain high limiting weights, for a particular set of parameter values. We then proceed to discuss the results in the experimental phase. The set of parameter values are as follows: the strategy update rate ρ = 0.05, the rematching probability µ = 0.02, weights on the reinforcement values in attraction updates ω = 0.1, and the sensitivity of the strategy choice to the attraction level λ = 4. Among the variety of parameter configurations with which we have experimented, this set of values provides the highest average performance for the four games considered here.
13 Our focus is on qualitative performance, namely the ability of the model to replicate the broad contours of the experimental data with respect to the attainment of fair and efficient outcomes. Sensitivity of results to changes in parameter values are discussed in Appendix C.
12 In order to make the game symmetric, the actions for the Column players in the Battle of the Sexes game have been relabeled as shown in figures 7 and 8 below.
13 We have experimented with all possible combinations of the following set of parameter values: ρ = {0.2, 0.1, 0.05}, ω = {0.025, 0.05, 0.1, 0.15, 0.2, 0.25, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7}, µ = {0.02, 0.01, 0.005}, and λ = {2.5, 3.0, 3.5, 4.0}. For all simulations, the population size is kept constant at 1000.
Pre-experimental Phase
What are the strategies that simulated players bring with them to the laboratory? In this section, we discuss the limiting distributions of probability weights in the pre-experimental phase to answer this question. we focus on strategies with high limiting probability weight. A strategy is said to have a high limiting probability weight if its weight is at least one standard deviation above the average probability weight across all strategies. These strategies are, in a sense, the principal strategies that players "bring to the laboratory" for the experimental phase.
Results for the 2 × 2 Stag Hunt are shown in Figure 4 . The strategies with high limiting probability weight are 'always play B', 'grim trigger', 'tit-for-tat', 'punish until the opponent retaliates', and 'punish once', respectively. The initial state of each of these strategies is B.
The first three do not require further explanation, since they have already been discussed in Section 3.1 above. Strategy 22 'punishes until the opponent retaliates': it starts by playing B and stays in this state as long as the opponent also plays B. Once the opponent plays A, however, it switches to playing A. It returns to B only if the opponent plays A, otherwise it stays in state A. Strategy 25, which 'punishes once', also starts with action B. It stays in state B unless the opponent plays A. Once the opponent plays A, state A is reached for exactly one period, after which the strategy returns to B regardless of the opponent's action.
Notice that if these five strategies are matched against each other, we will observe all players playing action B forever to achieve the efficient and fair outcome. Figure 5 shows the outcome of the pre-experimental phase for the Prisoner's Dilemma.
Strategies obtaining high limiting probability weights are 'punish once', 'tit-for-tat', 'punish until the opponent retaliates', and 'grim trigger', respectively. The initial state is A for these Figure 5: Approximated limiting probability weights across 26 strategies and strategies with high probability weights for Prisoner's Dilemma.
strategies. As in the case of the 2 × 2 Stag Hunt game, if these four strategies are played amongst themselves, the observed history of actions will involve mutual cooperation in all periods.
Since the Prisoner's Dilemma has received such widespread attention in economics, the strategies that emerge from the learning process in our model deserve further discussion.
The 'tit-for-tat' strategy was the winner in two tournaments organized by Axelrod (1984) and has been a subject of extensive study, especially in the context of evolutionary game theory. Axelrod and Hamilton (1981) have shown that 'tit-for-tat' is a neutrally stable strategy in the infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma with payoffs evaluated according to the limit-of-the-means criterion. This has been interpreted as providing theoretical support for the hypothesis that cooperation sustained through reciprocation is an inevitable outcome of evolutionary process. However, there are a large number of other repeated game strategies that are also neutrally stable, and some of them involve mutual defection in most periods.
The set of stable strategies can be refined substantially by introducing complexity costs (as in Binmore and Samuelson, 1992) or the possibility of errors in the implementation of strategies (as in Fundenberg and Maskin, 1990) . These refinements result in a prediction of mutual cooperation in the infinitely repeated prisoners' dilemma, although on the basis of strategies other than 'tit-for-tat'. We also find mutual cooperation to be the predicted outcome, although the model considered here is one of finite repetition and bounded complexity. The 'tit-for-tat' strategy survives but does not have the highest limiting probability weight: we find 'punish until the opponent retaliates' to be the most prolific strategy.
Results from the game of Chicken are summarized in Figure 6 . In this game, the strategies 'punish once', 'tit-for-tat', and 'punish until the opponent retaliates', are the ones with the high probability weights. Again, if these strategies are played only among themselves, we will observe only the efficient and fair outcome as both players continue to play action A.
Unlike the two games discussed above, however, there are a few other strategies with nonnegligible probability weights. The presence of these strategies will generate outcomes that Figure 7: Approximated limiting probability weights across 26 strategies and strategies with high probability weights for Battle of the Sexes.
are not efficient in the experimental phase as we show below. Just by examining the strategies with high limiting probability weights from the first phase of learning, we can expect that efficient and fair outcomes will be observed in the experimental phase. We now turn to discussion of our results for this phase. Figure 8 shows the results of simulation runs for the four games we have considered in the experimental phase. Also presented in the figure are results from two learning models -smoothed fictitious play and action-reinforcement learning. (See Appendix A for the algorithm used for generating the data for these models.)
Experimental Phase
For three of the four games -2 × 2 Stag Hunt, Prisoner's Dilemma, and Chickenthe efficient outcome is also fair. A majority of the simulated players who learn among repeated game strategies are successful in obtaining such an outcome. 14 They achieve this by repeatedly playing the action profiles {B,B} in the 2 × 2 Stag Hunt and {A,A} in the Prisoner's Dilemma and Chicken. In contrast, fictitious play generates a stage-game Nash equilibrium outcome as the theory predicts. Fictitious play thus generates an outcome that 14 The results for Chicken are somewhat weaker than those for the other games. in which the efficient outcome is one of the two pure-strategy stage-game Nash equilibria.
Also note that the Pareto superior equilibrium is more likely to be observed than the Pareto inferior one under fictitious play. Reinforcement learning among actions generates an efficient outcome that is not the stage-game Nash equilibrium in Prisoner's Dilemma and Chicken, but it is more likely to result in the Pareto inferior equilibrium in the coordination game.
This is an interesting contrast between the two models and deserves further investigation.
In the Battle of the Sexes game, the efficient and fair outcome requires coordinated alternation between two pure-strategy stage-game Nash equilibria. The results for this game are particularly striking. The simulation outcome shows that many of the players successfully learned, out of 26 possible repeated game strategies, to play the strategies that enable them to achieve the efficient and fair outcome. As one can clearly see in the figure, neither of the two action-learning models generates such an outcome. Efficiency and fairness arises in our model in one of two ways. Players may initially adopt strategies that quickly result in convergence to cooordinated alteration (if Strategy 12 were matched against Strategy 11 for instance; see Figure 8 ). Alternatively, when initial choices fail to achieve coordination (if both initially adopt Strategy 11 for instance) players successfully learn to switch to other strategies. The failure to coordinate eventually induced one of them to experiment with one of the other strategies. After the switch, convergence to efficient alternation occurs rapidly.
The probabilistic nature of strategy choice, however, can cause the players to mismatch even after several periods of successful alternation. This results in a fluctuation of payoffs in later periods. The battle of the sexes is a striking example of a game in which our approach predicts outcomes that are both consistent with experimental observation and virtually impossible to replicate with action-learning models.
Conclusion
We have demonstrated that a simple reinforcement model of learning applied to a restricted set of repeated game strategies can account for the behavior of human subjects in environments where fairness and reciprocity seem to play a significant role. We have done so without assuming that fairness and reciprocity are primitive concerns. Our results may also be of some interest from the perspective of the problem of equilibrium selection in games.
In pure coordination games, where fairness and efficiency are not in conflict, our findings predict that learning will converge to the efficient action profile. In the Battle of the Sexes, where efficient stage-game equilibria are unfair, the model predicts alternation over time to achieve a profile of average payoffs that is both efficient and fair. In the Prisoner's Dilemma, where fairness and efficiency are not in conflict but cannot be attained in equilibrium, the model predicts convergence to nonequilibrium strategy profiles.
One important direction for further research would be to study the feasibility of our approach in settings of greater complexity, with a larger set of players and stage game actions. A potential empirical extension is an analysis of the goodness-of-fit of the model to the large and varied experimental data that is available. This would require estimation of the model parameters and out-of-sample comparisons with other learning models.
Finally, it would be well worth developing a deeper analytical understanding of the process by which learning on the basis of material payoffs can result in behavior that appears to be motivated by fairness and efficiency concerns. A characterization of the class of games for which the learning dynamics converge to fair and efficient payoff profiles would be of considerable interest.
A Fictitious Play and Action-Reinforcement Learning
We provide here a brief discussion of two standard learning models. As shown in Camerer and Ho (1999), both fictitious play and reinforcement learning model can be considered as special cases of the experience weighted attraction (EWA) learning model. The following formulation is a simplified version of the EWA model.
Let A i a (t) be player i's attractions to the action a ∈ S at period t, where S is player i's action set. For each player, attractions evolve over time as weighted averages of their previous values and current reinforcement values. Let a −i (t) be the actions chosen by a player's opponents, denoted by −i, at period t. The player's attraction to action a evolves as follows:
It is easy to verify that fictitious play is equivalent to having ω i a (t + 1) = 1/(t + 1) for all a. A reinforcement learning model can be obtained by setting
if action a is chosen in period t 0 otherwise where n a (·) is the total number of times the action a has been chosen since the beginning of play plus its initial value n a (0). In the simulation in section 4.2, we assume no 'preexperimental' learning for these models, as in the previous literature. We set n a (0) equal to 1, and the initial attraction for all actions, A i a (0) is set to be the expected payoff given a random choice by both players. The probability with which each action is chosen is given by equation 2 in Section 3.2. 
B The Complete Set of Strategies Considered

C Sensitivity of Results to Parameter Changes
The model has four parameters: the strategy update rate ρ, the re-matching rate, µ, are the rematching rate µ and the frequency of experimentation ρ. We shall discuss here the sensitivity of our results to changes in these two parameters, holding constant ω = 0.1 and λ = 4.0.
Recall that our measure of performance is qualitative, namely the extent to which the model's predictions fit the broad contours of the experimental data. For the games considered here, experimental subjects appear to coordinate frequently on patterns of play that produce efficient and fair average payoffs over time. One way to track the sensitivity of the model to parameter changes is therefore to look at deviations of average payoffs from the efficient level. This is done in Table 1 , which summarizes the performance of the model for various pairs of ρ and µ. The entries in the table refer to the ratio of the average payoff to the efficient payoff. The parameter pair for which results are reported in the text is in bold.
The results for the 2 × 2 Stag Hunt are relatively insensitive to changes in strategy updating rates and the re-matching probability. We suspect that this is because convergence occurs to a Nash equilibrium of the stage game, as is predicted also by most action-learning models. The other games show different degrees of sensitivity. Results for the Prisoner's Dilemma are quite sensitive to the strategy update rate ρ. If the strategy update rate is high, i.e., when ρ = 0.2, the mean payoff becomes much lower relative to the efficient outcome. This is because if players update their strategies too frequently, reciprocation strategies such as 'tit-for-tat' lose the opportunity to punish defectors for many periods in order to discourage Table 1 : Population mean per-period average payoff (mean payoff) relative to the payoff in the efficient and fair outcome for each of the game. λ and ω are set equal to 4.0 and 0.1, respectively.
others from defecting in the future. Therefore, a high ρ leads to the situation in which players learn to use strategies that involve more defections. The re-matching probability, on the other hand, does not have a strong impact on the result (provided that it remains much lower than the experimentation rate). In the game of Chicken, as in the Prisoner's Dilemma, a higher strategy update rate prevents players from achieving the efficient outcome.
The re-matching probability exercises a modest influence in this game, with higher rates of rematching tending to result in lower payoffs.
The environment in which results are most sensitive to parameter values is the Battle of the Sexes. Results are affected both by the strategy updating rate and the re-matching probability to a greater extent than in the other three cases, and these effects are rather complex. When updating is infrequent (ρ = 0.05), frequent rematching is helpful in generating alternation. On the other hand, when updating is itself more frequent, then more frequent rematching can lead to declines in efficiency. Hence the learning of successful alternation strategies in this setting depends quite critically on the conditions under which pre-experimental learning occurs. This sensitivity we attribute to the fact that the attainment of fair and efficient outcomes require a pattern of alternation over time that is harder to learn than the repetition of a single action profile.
